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ABSTRACT 
Globalization has had progress and despairs, and has also opened the door to heated 
debates. The trend has been to globalize property rights. With this comes the sense 
that duties to civil society in the way of harm prevention, justice, and protection of 
the natural environment are easily side-stepped. The Bhopal Disaster of 1984 
remains the world’s worst industrial disaster and worth revisiting so as to 
understand the culture of corporate behavior in disclaiming and side-stepping 
certain vital social responsibilities. This paper revisits the Bhopal Disaster and 
highlights elements that ought to keep us vigilant about the path globalization takes. 
Keywords: Bhopal disaster, capitalism, social harm, union carbide 
corporation, globalization, corporate crime. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Globalization has come to mean different things to different people, 
different countries, and even different disciplines of study. How the 
countries of the Third World, for example, conceive of globalization may be 
asymmetric to that of developed countries. How the poor reflect on what 
they are told to be a process of globalization is unlikely to concur with the 
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way the affluent does. The way elements of globalization are taught in a 
sociology or political science course is likely to be different from what one 
would expect of them in an economics or international finance course. There 
is, in other words, a lot to be said about Anthony Giddens’ observation 
when he says that globalization has been very uneven (Giddens, 1999). 
Despite the myriad scholarship on the subject-matter (Held, 2004; Singer, 
2004; Truillot, 2002; Shiva, 1999; Howard-Hassmann, 2010; Bhalla, 2002; 
Stiglitz 2008; Payne 2008; Hill & Rapp 2009; Ezeonu 2008), there is still no 
consensus on the value of globalization. There are controversies over how 
the benefits and harms of globalization are measured and whether it is 
premature to make a conclusive statement on the matter (Singer, 2004; 
Howard-Hassmann 2010; Stiglitz 2008).  
In the contemporary setting, although the Internet and the technologization 
of industries with the aid of computers have revolutionized much of the 
world, globalization in social and political debates tends to mean the 
economic processes that characterize it and indeed the impact it has on 
social life. Specifically, the economic aspects tend to take the form of a 
pattern towards a global integration of the economies of the world through a 
fundamental liberalization of trade and markets, but its social (and political) 
impacts center on whether people are employed or jobless, whether they are 
included/excluded or facilitated, harmed or respected and protected, 
whether they are made better off or worse off, whether they are dealt with 
inequitably or appropriately, whether they are dispossessed of ethical 
sovereignty or maintain autonomy, and so on. Hence the idea of, and 
movements for, social justice in respect of globalization. So conceived, this 
paper revisits the Bhopal Disaster that took place in Bhopal, India in 1984 to 
help re-acquaint us with some of the vital variables that must be given 
attention in discussions about globalization and the behaviour of corporate 
entities and international financial institutions.  
Corporate Impunity, IFIs and Power Politics 
One of the problem zones for globalization in its current phase has been the 
equities available for corporate leverage while social groups and other 
constituents in developing as well as developed countries complain about 
being undermined both politically and economically. Since developing 
countries are by definition not in good economic standing, they are in a 
compromised position in addressing issues of foreign investment. On the 
one hand, such governments have to demonstrate to their societies that they 
are making efforts to keep their people employed and thus be seen by their 
people as serving some positive value. On the other hand, they cannot risk 
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being viewed as uncooperative in dealing with international financial 
institutions (IFIs) such as the World Trade Organization, the International 
Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. Otherwise they could be black-listed 
in the trade market and among the IFIs (Singer, 2004; Stiglitz 2008). The rich 
and powerful countries on the world stage tend to approach international 
issues not on the basis of what is fair but rather on the basis of how it best 
advances their own interests (Stiglitz 2008).  
Remarking on his role as Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers 
during the Clinton administration, Joseph Stiglitz (2008, 177) claims that 
when it came to international issues: “The question was: What is best for the 
United States? What is best for American companies? The contradiction this 
generates comes through in the kinds of policies adopted.” In other words, 
international policies are geared towards the benefit of those who have sway 
in the real world of power politics and so if developing countries are seen as 
uncooperative, they risk consequences both at the level of the IFIs and in the 
global corporate arena (Stiglitz 2002, 2008; Singer 2004). There has already 
been much evidence of this in respect of trade related intellectual property 
rights (TRIPS) where powerful multinational corporations insisted that their 
governments discipline poor countries through harsh trade restrictions (Hill 
& Rapp, 2009; Singer 2004; Howard Hassmann 2010).  
The history of judgements at, and grievances filed with, the WTO suggests 
that the WTO has been controlled by the powerful countries on the world 
stage (Singer 2004). Therefore, measures taken by the WTO tend to be 
slanted in favour of rich, developed countries (Singer, 2004; Stiglitz, 2002; 
Izarali, 2011). In such a context, transnational corporations are seen as 
having a disproportionate level of power whereas developing countries are 
relegated to a despondent state of facilitating lax business conditions 
(McMurtry, 1998). Certainly, as Rhoda Howard-Hassmann (2010) has 
pointed out, one must not lose sight also of the extent to which corruption in 
developing countries played a role in perpetuating destitute or unfavourable 
conditions for such societies. That said, developed countries are not exempt 
from receiving the short end of the stick by corporate entities, only that 
developing countries are more vulnerable and suffer a history of 
exploitation (McMurtry, 1998). Of course, some such powers are also 
enjoyed by non-transnational and family run corporations as well. 
Globalization & Criminology 
One of the gaps in discussions on globalization is the limited focus on the 
issue by criminologists. Although one might plausibly argue that 
globalization has been with us since time immemorial – ranging from the 
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movement of people to the transmission of knowledge, from the spread of 
cuisines to the exchange of goods across oceans – there has been a noticeable 
gap in the literature from the mainstream criminology quarters when it 
comes to globalization and issues of crime and justice. This is the case 
despite the myriad cases of social injustices raised by and for globalization in 
the times in which we live. There are, for example, issues of the 
maltreatment of labour in places like Asia and Latin America, harmful 
product quality, inequitable trade arrangements brokered by rich countries 
with poor countries, political oppression in trade arrangements and so on. 
Yet, surprisingly the bulk of criminologists historically have had a fixed 
focus on the more conventional types of crime and few focus on the newer 
dimensions of criminality raised by globalization and globalism (Friedrichs 
2007).  
Professor David Friedrichs, a pioneer in developing the research literature 
on crimes of/and globalization, may be quite on the pulse in observing that: 
“Criminology as a field may well be too wedded to the theories, methods, 
and substantive concerns that emerged principally in the mid-20th century 
period, a time very different from the present” (Friedrichs 2007, 5). In 2007, 
he stated that: “A number of readings on transnational crime have now been 
published, but to date there are no textbooks in the conventional sense on 
transnational, international, and global criminology” (Friedrichs 2007, 5).  
Ifeanyi Ezeonu (2008), in his analysis of crimes of globalization in sub-
Saharan Africa in relation to health, has also observed the reserve of 
mainstream criminologists to traverse the newer trajectories raised by 
globalization. He gives an account of crimes perpetrated by the rich and 
powerful on countries/societies of the weak through the Bretton Woods 
institutions. He too has acknowledged the historical paucity of literature 
when it comes to social harm. He claims this is partly because the prevailing 
schools of thought did not see beyond the “hegemony” of the criminal/state 
law in conceptualizing the idea and instances of crime. He argues that “most 
laws (including criminal laws) are political instruments embodying the 
values of the dominant class, race, gender, and other social groups in 
society,” but that this characteristic has not generally caught the attention of 
traditional criminologists (Ezeonu, 2008). Nevertheless, there has been an 
increased focus on globalization by criminologists as something that has 
criminogenic (social harm) elements (Ezeonu 2008, 119).  
One of the problems, of course, is that raising such issues risks being 
branded Left or socialistic or some other label by which it is implied an 
unwillingness to value individualism and the free enterprise system (Ezeonu 
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2008; Friedrichs 2007). Such labelling, however, does not contribute to taking 
the discussion further. Such labelling more reflects the tunnel vision of the 
ardent proponents of capitalism who are blind to the harms that accompany 
it, an especially sad state of affairs considering that by addressing them a 
better, more responsible outcome may emerge (Izarali, 2011). It is no 
different from the committed critics of globalization who fail to see or are 
unwilling to acknowledge any positive element of it (Izarali, 2011). In such 
contexts, ideological commitments drive the intellectual pen, and critical 
constructive debate that can augment the global good goes by the wayside, 
while at the same time we are said to be involved in scholarly assessments.  
Against such blind spots, it must be said that globalization raises a plethora 
of issues for law and justice as it does for technology, political economy, and 
security, and consequently for criminology to move with the times, it has to 
address the relevant issues raised by and for globalization. Issues involving 
transnational crime, political and economic oppression, trade treaties 
injustices, institutional and institutionalized oppression, etc. cannot simply 
be ignored by mainstream criminologists or deferred to political science or 
some other when they embody critical criminogenic elements. If they raise 
serious issues for the state of public morality to the extent that discussions 
focus on drafting binding rules of engagement or criminal law for deterrence 
or punishment, then that is at least one basis to engage criminology. In the 
current times, there is an international criminal court so there is foundation 
for development.  
Capitalism has long raised issues of injustices/harm because of its fixation 
on monetary value. Given that in many fundamental respects globalization 
is a proliferation of capitalism on the world scene, such issues cannot be cast 
into oblivion by criminology scholars. The object here is not to slam the 
sledge hammer on capitalism but to acknowledge, as the philosopher Leo 
Groarke (2000) has delineated, the strengths and weaknesses so that its 
weaknesses as they materialize in economic globalization may have some 
remedial approach, however difficult or daunting a task that may appear to 
be. As we look to deal with issues raised by globalization through 
transnational corporate entities, there are events in history that may do well 
to set the framework for an equitable and hospitable climate of globalization. 
One such case is the Bhopal disaster to which I now turn. 
Reflecting on the Bhopal Disaster 
The Bhopal Disaster which took place in India in 1984 remains both a 
grievous and telling case and worthy of criminogenic inquiry. This event is 
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grievous because it is the world’s worst industrial disaster in which 
thousands of people died and over a hundred thousand people continue to 
suffer serious injuries including those born to children-survivors of the 
tragedy (Eckerman, 2005; ICMR Report, 2010). It is telling because it spans 
an era when economic globalization was casting its mold and in which the 
corporation, Union Carbide Corporation (UCC), and its successor, Dow 
Chemical, continued to deny legal liability for the harms to human and 
planetary life. Some 30 tons of methyl isocyante (MIC), a lethal gas, was 
leaked into the atmosphere due to a range of faulty safety oversights, poor 
servicing of equipment, and faulty instrumentations. It stemmed from cost 
cutting measures and faulty ethical compliance by the Union Carbide 
Corporation, and affected some 40 square kilometers (Eckerman, 2005; 
Banerjee, 1986; Robertson and Fadil, 1998). The gas may have also included 
other toxic agents such as hydrogen cyanide, nitrogen oxide, and carbon 
monoxide (Banerjee, 1986; Dhara and Dhara, 2002; ICMR Report, 2010). The 
groundwater still remains contaminated and survivors continue to be 
physically and emotionally traumatized (Dhara and Dhara, 2002, 402; 
Srishti, 2002; Eckerman, 2005; Fletcher, Ono, and Roy, 2005, 7; ICMR Report, 
2010; Mishra et al., 2009: 196; Sarangi, 2009).  
The Union Carbide Corporation entered a settlement with the Indian 
Government in 1989 for $470 million as taking moral responsibility 
(Eckerman, 2005). At face value, it appears large but realistically it was/is 
insufficient to address the magnitude of the harm, the loss of life, and the 
rehabilitation needed for human lives and of the environment. It pales when 
one considers that settlement in the Exxon Valdez oil spill when the vessel 
ran aground in Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, Alaska was in excess of 
this and involved no loss of human life (Broughton, 2005; Mathur and 
Morehouse, 2002, 70).  
Union Carbide Corporation’s History in India 
The Union Carbide Corporation had its genesis in 1898 to manufacture 
calcium carbide to produce acetylene (Bennett et al., 2005; Agarwal et al., 
1985). By 1917 it was formally established as Union Carbide and Carbon 
Corporation through a collaborative venture, but this essentially amounted 
to a holding company of autonomous units (Bennett et al., 2005; see also 
www.uniocarbide.com/history). In 1919 it filed a patent to process ethylene 
for commercial use. It later went on to produce such things as anti-freeze 
(Prestone), batteries (Eveready) and ferroalloys (Banerjee 1986; Agarwal et 
al., 1985; Bennett et al., 2005). It even engaged in manufacturing uranium 
and uranium concentrates at the start of WWII (Bennett et al., 2005; Agarwal 
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et al., 1985, 14). Agarwal et al. (1985, 14) state that: “Successive world wars 
influenced the company’s growth. The First World War moved it from a 
primarily metals and carbon products company into gases and chemicals. 
The Second World War led the company into the atomic energy program.”  
By 1984 Union Carbide was reporting $9 billion in annual sales. The 
company employed approximately 100,000 employees in 40 countries, and 
was the 37th largest company in the world (Bennett et al., 2005; Browning, 
1993; Broughton, 2005). In other words, the company had built a stature 
internationally prior to the Bhopal disaster. The company also identified 
itself as one of the leaders in industry safety (Browning, 1993). Union 
Carbide existed in India since the mid-1920s producing batteries in Calcutta, 
which by 1934 formally gave rise to the Ever Ready Company Ltd. The year 
1984 had marked the company’s 50th anniversary for Union Carbide India 
Limited (UCIL) (Browning, 1993). Jackson B. Browning (1993), retired Vice 
President of Health, Safety and Environmental Programs at UCC, stated that 
“UCIL had sales of about $200 million annually. It operated 14 plants across 
India, and was organized into five operating divisions with 9,000 
employees.”  
Operations at the many divisions had been theoretically under the 
management of an Indian division called Union Carbide India Ltd (UCIL), 
which was overseen by Union Carbide Eastern Division in Hong Kong. 
Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) had 50.9% ownership in UCIL and the 
rest were owned by 23,000 Indian shareholders and 24 percent by 
government-run insurance companies (Browning, 1993; Trotter et al., 1989). 
Although a Hong Kong division was in the picture, the major decisions of 
UCIL were approved by UCC headquarters in the U.S. Some thinkers claim 
UCC was known for centralized decision making (Eckerman, 2005; 
Morehouse and Subramaniam, 1986; Banerjee, 1986). 
UCC and Pesticides in India 
The impetus to produce pesticides in Bhopal has to be understood in the 
context of the so-called “Green Revolution” in India. India had aimed to 
become food self-sufficient, particularly given the backdrop of a famine in 
1977 (Bowonder, Kasperson, and Kasperson, 1985; Broughton, 2005). Since 
agriculture was India’s bedrock, the damage caused by pests and the desire 
to optimize its crop yields had to be addressed. Thus the Indian government 
undertook policies in the 1970s to attract the investment of foreign 
companies in local industries and in this regard Union Carbide is said to 
have been asked to set up a plant in Bhopal for the production of a pesticide 
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called Sevin, which was commonly applied in Asia (Bowonder, Kasperson, 
and Kasperson, 1985; Broughton, 2005).  
The Bhopal plant was opened in 1969 (Eckerman, 2005, 24; Banerjee, 1986). 
The initial approval of the plant was for the production of pesticides using 
MIC and other component chemicals that were imported in small quantities 
from the parent company (Banerjee, 1986; Morehouse and Subramaniam, 
1986). MIC is an irritant to the skin, the eyes, and the respiratory mucous 
membrane (Banerjee, 1986; ICMR Report, 2010, 66). As the Indian Council 
for Medical Research (ICMR) noted in its 2010 report (ICMR Report, 2010, 
66): “MIC is a strong poison, even on swallowing; the injury that is caused to 
the mucosa is because of the exothermic reaction when coming into contact 
with moisture of the tissues.”  
MIC also decomposes to hydrogen cyanide and carbon dioxide when 
pyrolized between 427 and 548 degrees Celcius (Dhara and Dhara, 2002, 391; 
Eckerman, 2005; Banerjee, 1986; ICMR Report, 2010). Banerjee (1986, 62) tells 
us that: “MIC is considered so dangerous that any British company using or 
storing it would have to file contingency plans to deal with the consequences 
of a leakage. Colourless, odourless and highly volatile, its most lethal aspect 
in the event of an escape into the atmosphere is that it would probably be 
impossible to contain within a plant or storage tank in the factory.”  
The company made a shift towards what is called “backward integration” in 
which component chemicals like MIC were being manufactured in Bhopal as 
opposed to being imported from the United States (Broughton, 2005; 
Banerjee, 1986; Eckerman, 2005). Eventually the Bhopal plant was operating 
below capacity because of natural conditions incurred by farmers through 
pervasive crop failures in Asia and a drought in 1977, loss of capital, and 
increased indebtedness (Bowonder et al., 1985, 7; Hager, 1985, 35; Banerjee, 
1986). Thus, farmers found it unaffordable to buy expensive pesticides and 
so substituted cheaper alternatives to Sevin (Broughton, 2005; Bowonder et 
al., 1985). This situation negatively impacted the company. The plant, for 
example, produced less than 1,000 tons whereas it had expected to produce 
5,000 tons and it had suffered a loss nearing $4 million by 1984 (Bowonder et 
al., 1985; Hager, 1985, 35). UCC issued notice to UCIL in July 1984 to prepare 
the plant for sale (Browning, 1993).  
Since no buyer was forthcoming, efforts were geared to migrating its major 
production infrastructures to some other developing country (Broughton, 
2005). Given the intention to liquidate the plant, UCC undertook a rigid cost-
cutting initiative at the Bhopal plant in the months leading up to the 
disaster, especially since the plant was producing below its capacity. This 
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initiative would in time tarnish UCC’s image in the social landscape, as the 
Bhopal plant encountered irregular servicing, improperly trained and 
insufficient staff, and malfunctioning and decaying instruments and 
equipment (Eckerman 2005; Banerjee 1986; Bowonder, Kasperson, and 
Kasperson, 1985; Broughton, 2005).  
The Bhopal Disaster: Cause and Circumstances 
Notwithstanding the above profile, inquiries must still be made into the 
cause of the disaster. The preceding discussion implies some of the 
circumstances were leading up to the disaster, i.e., a disaster in waiting. 
Union Carbide maintains on its website that the tragedy was the result of 
sabotage (see www.uniocarbide.com/history). Jackson B. Browning (1993), 
who was involved in the disaster response for the company, claimed that 
“No balanced analysis of Union Carbide’s reaction to the Bhopal tragedy is 
possible without recognizing the considerable emphasis the company and its 
affiliates had placed on safe operations.” Certainly, it seems counterintuitive 
to think any company or its executives will proclaim their operation as 
replete with flaws, particularly as such a claim may open the floodgate to 
criminal and civil lawsuits. The history of serious gas leaks (discussed later) 
at the Bhopal plant prior to the tragedy and those at the Institute, Virginia 
plant after the Bhopal disaster makes a compelling case to refute the idea of 
UCC as a champion of safe operations.  
According to numerous accounts by commentators (Morehouse and 
Subramaniam 1986; Banerjee, 1986; Chouhan, 1994; Eckerman, 2005), 
sometime on 2 December 1984 the production superintendent at the factory 
had ordered the MIC plant supervisor to flush out a few lines leading from 
the phosgene area to the vent gas scrubber (VGS), a unit that neutralizes 
toxic gas by spraying caustic soda on it (Report of the ICFTU-ICEF Mission, 
1985, 6). Safety procedures required some preliminary preparation of the 
area before line flushing could begin. Specifically, a slip blind (a physical 
barrier) must be inserted into a pipe or fitting to prevent material from going 
beyond a certain point during the flushing (Banerjee, 1986; Eckerman, 2005; 
Fink 1986). However, the slip blind was never inserted. This failed task was 
the responsibility of the maintenance crew whereas line washing was the 
responsibility of an MIC operator (Banerjee, 1986; Eckerman, 2005).  
As the position of maintenance supervisor on the second shift was 
eliminated a few days earlier, there was apparently no supervisor to instruct 
the workers to insert the slip blind (Eckerman, 2005). The task of flushing 
out the lines involved connecting a water supply line to a certain section of 
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the unit. The MIC operator pumped the water in at high pressure but 
noticed that the water was not exiting at the same pace. The matter was 
reported to his supervisor, someone who had been transferred from a 
different division recently and insufficiently trained for his new post, who 
ordered him to resume flushing (Fink,1986, 173; Banerjee, 1986). Some time 
shortly after 11 p.m., the operator in the control room of the plant became 
concerned when he noticed that the pressure in one of the underground tank 
was rising rapidly (Eckerman 2005). It was in fact the liquid MIC changing 
into gas, as the temperature had already exceeded the level required for this 
transformation (Banerjee, 1986).  
The design of the unit was such that it had certain built-in safety 
mechanisms. One of them was a safety valve that was ‘blanketed’ with 
nitrogen and located at the neck of the tube that carried fluid to the alpha 
napthol plant (Banerjee, 1986; Morehouse and Subramaniam, 1986). This 
valve was meant to serve as a cushion to some of the pressure in the tanks. If 
the pressure in the tanks were to exceed a certain limit, the safety valve 
would be released to allow for an automatic scrubbing operation in what is 
called the Vent Gas Scrubber (VGS), essentially releasing caustic soda to 
neutralize the gas (Banerjee, 1986; Morehouse and Subramaniam,1986). The 
residue would then pass through a tube and enter another unit called the 
flare tower, which stands some 30 feet above ground. The flare tower is a 
narrow vertical structure like a chimney with a continuous fire at the top 
that incinerates the residue. The flare tower was an end of the line safety 
mechanism that treats certain gas/residue with heat (Banerjee 1986).  
These safety mechanisms were out of commission at the time, and led to a 
systems failure overall (Fink, 1986, 173). Some 30 tons of MIC gas escaped 
into the atmosphere (Eckerman, 2005). It caused havoc in the streets of 
Bhopal in the dark night, debilitating and incapacitating humans and 
animals and destroying the natural environment (Eckerman, 2005; Banerjee, 
1986). In commenting on the scientific structure of the plant, Banerjee (1986) 
claims that even if these safety devices were operational they could not have 
prevented the disaster because they could not handle the capacity of the 
chemical that the Bhopal plant was processing, since they were designed to 
handle a much smaller volume. Additionally, there was a lack of redundant 
alarm systems and indicator instruments at the factory (Banerjee, 1986). 
Banerjee (1986) argues that a factory of this nature was supposed to be 




Evidence from previous warnings, workers complaints and safety 
inspections underscored the Bhopal plant as a disaster in waiting (see Report 
of the ICFTU-ICEF Mission, 1985; Morehouse and Subramaniam, 1986; 
Eckerman, 2005; Banerjee, 1986, 114-115; Chouhan, 1994). For example, there 
were minor leaks of MIC in 1980 when the plant was established. On 
December 26, 1981, one plant operator died from exposure to a phosgene 
leak. In January 1982, a damaged seal in the pipeline resulted in phosgene 
leak which affected 25 workers (Banerjee 1986, 112). On February 9, 1982, a 
phosgene leak seriously affected 24 people. At midnight on October 5, 1982, 
there was a leak of MIC at the plant, which resulted in respiratory problems 
and watering of the eyes to those who were affected (Banerjee 1986, 112).  
Setting aside these recurring leaks, a safety audit of the Bhopal plant was 
carried out some two years prior to the disaster by experts from the UCC’s 
American division that clearly identified some serious safety concerns, yet 
no corrective actions were ever taken (Eckerman 2005). The three-man team 
from the U.S. identified, according to the Report of the ICFTU-ICEF Mission 
(1985, 11), 10 major concerns. It was Congressman Henry Waxman in the 
U.S. who revealed a UCC internal report before a house of representatives 
subcommittee on health and the environment that had warned three months 
before the Bhopal Disaster of possible catastrophic failures and runaway 
reactions of lethal gas at the Bhopal plant (Eckerman, 2005; Fink, 1985, 176; 
Banerjee, 1985, 118). Jackson Browning acknowledged having knowledge 
about this but claimed he never forwarded it to the Bhopal plant (Fink, 1985, 
176; Banerjee, 1985, 118). Yet despite this acknowledgement UCC continued 
to insist that UCIL was more or less independent of the parent company in 
terms of safety oversight and operations (Eckerman, 2005; Banerjee, 1985).  
It was most striking that despite the company’s self-proclamation as a safety 
champion in the face of the Bhopal Disaster, the company’s Institute (West 
Virginia) plant experienced a toxic gas leak eight months and eight days 
after the Bhopal tragedy, which resulted in 135 residents from the area 
seeking treatment at the hospital (Fink, 1985, 181). This plant was shut down 
for some five months after the Bhopal Disaster to ensure that all operations 
and safety mechanisms were fit, a task for which $5 million for safety 
improvements were to be allocated (Fink, 1985, 181). That plant and the one 
at Bhopal were said to be identical but a more lax approach was taken with 
the Bhopal plant (Banerjee 1986).  
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The Cost Cutting Syndrome 
The cost-cutting syndrome prevailed at the expense of safety operations and 
public safety. About a year prior to the disaster the company disconnected 
the 30-ton refrigeration system designed to keep stored MIC at a 
temperature of about zero degrees Celcius; its freon content was extracted 
for use elsewhere in the plant (see Morehouse and Subramaniam, 1986; 
Banerjee, 1986; Fink, 1985; Report of the ICFTU-ICEF Mission, 1985). The 
push to cut cost came from the company’s head office in the U.S. As Ingrid 
Eckerman (2005, 32) noted:  
In 1983, there was great pressure from the Danbury head office in the 
U.S.A. to cut expenses. Decisions were made to prolong the time 
between certain checks from six to 12 months, and to replace 
damaged stainless steel pipes with ordinary [carbon] steel pipes. 
Items that should have been replaced every six months were used for 
more than two years. Faulty instruments were not replaced. 
The plant was experiencing a period of weak demand for its pesticides in the 
Indian market (Banerjee, 1986, 126). In fact it was producing at one third of 
its capacity, which was at variance with its projected 47% break-even point 
(Banerjee, 1986, 126). As a consequence, between 1983 and 1984, it laid off 
300 temporary workers (Eckerman 2005). On November 26, 1984, the 
maintenance supervisor position on the second shift was eliminated and the 
responsibilities were passed on to the production supervisor who was 
transferred from a battery plant one month prior to the accident (Banerjee, 
1986). The production supervisor was not qualified for the position to which 
he was assigned, nor was he aware of the dangers associated with the 
chemicals. The same applied to other employees (Chouhan, 1994).  
The Result: Medical and Morbidity – Then and Now 
The preceding findings are contrary to Jackson Browning’s claim about 
UCC’s safety dedication. The tragedy resulted in thousands of preventable 
deaths and suffering. The exact number of people who died is not certain 
because many people were buried and cremated en masse due to concerns 
over corpse decomposition and the gravity of the tragedy, not to mention 
the wholesale confusion and pandemonium, and so official counts do not 
have a record for everyone (Eckerman 2005). Estimates vary, as offered by 
different organizations and authorities, but all put the death toll in the 
thousands. Eckerman estimates between 3000 and 10,000 people died in the 
first weeks (Eckerman, 2005). Banerjee claims there were some 15,000 
corpses, 50,000 cripple or maimed persons and 250,000 persons badly 
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affected (Banerjee, 1986, 114). Amnesty International (2004) claims that 7000 
people died in the first two to three days of the accident and that in the 20 
years that followed over 15,000 died from related illnesses.  
At the time of the disaster, Bhopal had a population of roughly 800,000 of 
which 38% were in the age group of 0-14 (Eckerman, 2005, 13). Those who 
continue to suffer serious long term injuries are estimated to be in excess of 
100,000 and include those who were children at the time of the disaster and 
their offspring (Eckerman 2005). Later toxicological studies carried out by 
the Indian Council for Medical Research confirmed the presence of 
hydrogen cyanide in the tissue samples kept from autopsies carried out at 
the time of the disaster. Indeed the ICMR has clearly said that the disaster is 
not due to MIC alone but its pyrolyzed products as well (ICMR Report, 2010, 
7). 
The scope and degree of the disaster is not fully captured when we say that 
victims of the disaster suffered/suffer terribly. Ingrid Eckerman (2005, 97), a 
Swedish medical doctor who sat on the International Medical Commission 
of Bhopal, gives some insight when she writes:  
The patients who invaded Hamidia hospital had spasms and 
convulsions. They gasped for breath, their nostrils were quivering, 
the lips were cyanoptic. They had foetid breath and blood-streaked 
froth. When the doctors listened with their stethoscopes, they heard 
gurgling rattles from the lungs and faint heart sounds. Other 
symptoms were spasms in the oesophagus and intestines, attacks of 
blindness and sweating. The patients were bewildered and had 
amnesia. 
Her account above of course does not identify those who were not fortunate 
to make it to the hospital including children below two years of age and the 
elderly, both of whom she claims were the hardest hit (Eckerman, 2005, 99). 
The gas leak was likewise hard on women in more ways than one, affecting 
not just their immediate features but also their reproductive health, and 
caused an immediate rise in still birth at the time of 300 percent and 200 
percent increase in perinatal and neonatal mortality. According to the 
Bhopal Group for Information and Action (2000, 3):  
Young women who were exposed at infancy have chaotic and 
painful menstrual cycles on attaining puberty. Many have three to 
four cycles in a month and there are those as old as 17 or 18 who 
have yet to have their periods. Young people between 15 and 18 
years look like they are 10 or 11 because of exposure-induced growth 
problems documented by ICMR. 
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Thus, the scars live on not just at a psychological level but also in their 
procreative capacity. Victims of the disaster suffered pulmonary odema, 
conjunctivitis, collapsed lungs, among numerous other ailments (Dhara and 
Dhara, 2002; Eckerman, 2005). Human corpse were littered all over in the 
vicinity of the accident. Long term studies carried out by the ICMR sourced 
damage to the respiratory, ocular, gastro-intestinal, and reproductive 
systems to toxins that were found in the blood stream of victims 
(Sambhavna Report, 2000; Mishra et al., 2009). At least 125,000 people are 
still chronically ill (Sambhavna Report, 2000). The long term report of the 
ICMR (2010, 3) entitled Health Effects of the Toxic Gas Leak From Union Carbide 
Methyl Isocyanate Plant in Bhopal: Technical Report on Pathology and Toxicology 
(1984-1992) emphasizes:  
It must be recognized that while the eyes and respiratory system 
showed striking disturbances from the beginning, wide-spread 
multi-organ involvement in the exposed population was also 
observed. There were cases of coma, a striking feature in the acute 
phase; gastrointestinal disturbances were common; there were 
significant lesions in the central nervous system; above all 
psychological trauma and behavioural disturbances continued to be 
a dominant feature without abatement to this day for a long time. 
The bottom line is that those who died as a result of the leaked gas in Bhopal 
died a terrible death, and those who have survived are badly affected by 
what in essence was an unprecedented disaster produced by a rich 
multinational corporation. Yet the survivors continue to be deprived of vital 
support to help them alleviate the strains that characterize their daily 
struggles. 
Legal Issues 
After much legal denial of fault and claims by UCC that the Bhopal plant 
operated under UCIL and so was not the responsibility of UCC, the UCC 
and the Indian government entered a settlement in 1989 of $US 470 million 
dollars, but the company denied legal responsibility. The Government of 
India had passed the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Act that made it the sole 
representative of the victims so as to expedite legal matters. The amount in 
the settlement was/is paltry because it is insufficient to address the harms 
and fatalities as well as rehabilitation issues of survivors, many of whom for 




In the beginning the Indian government endeavoured to have the case tried 
in New York since it was an American multinational corporation, on the 
basis that Indian laws were not adequate for a tort litigation of this 
magnititude (Pillay, 2006). But the matter was sent back for trial in India by 
Justice Keenan of New York on the basis of forum non conveniens, the ground 
upon which Union Carbide had contested the idea of trial in the U.S. (Pillay, 
2006; Sharma, 2009; Rogge, 2001). Sukanya Pillay argues that the UCC 
employed a racist strategy in arguing that: 
[t]he [sic] practical impossibility for American courts and juries, 
imbued with US cultural values, living standards and expectations, 
to determine living standards for people living in the slums or 
‘hutments’ surrounding the UCIL, Bhopal, India, by itself confirms 
that the Indian forum is overwhelmingly the most appropriate. Such 
abject poverty and the vastly different values, standards and 
expectations which accompany it are commonplace in India and the 
Third World. They are incomprehensible to Americans living in the 
United States (cited in Pillay 2006, 486-487). 
In delivering his judgement it is interesting that Justice Keenan noted that 
India had more interest in the outcome and therefore the American judiciary 
should not be pushed beyond capacity (Pillay, 2006, 487; Sharma, 2009).  
The victims of Bhopal are still without adequate care and provisions 
(Eckerman, 2005; Pillay, 2006). They still suffer birth defects, vision 
problems, stomach problems and lung problems among a slate of others 
(Pillay, 2006; ICMR Report, 2010; Sarangi, 2009). Union Carbide was later 
sold to Dow Chemical in 2001, which made Dow the largest chemical 
corporation in the world, but Dow claimed that it did not acquire UCC’s 
liabilities (Eckerman, 2005; Pillay, 2006). Energies are still devoted to raising 
the concerns of victims and the community in legal proceedings, some of 
which have results and some of which are yet to be determined (Pillay, 2006; 
see Zavetoski 2009 on social justice movements). In 2010, seven Indian 
citizens who served with UCIL were convicted in a Bhopal court of causing 
death by negligence (Amnesty International – News, 2010). They got the 
maximum penalty of two years prison sentence. At the moment there is a 
curative petition (No. 345-347 of 2011, Union of India vs. Union Carbide 
Corporation & Anr.) filed with the civil appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court of India for enhancement of compensation to victims. It must be said 
that in earlier years some critical matters were processed in court, requiring 
Union Carbide’s then CEO and others to appear before the Court in Bhopal 
but no one did. Thus, they have been deemed by the Courts in India as 
fugitives of justice. 
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Why Revisit the Bhopal Disaster? 
One may understandably ask: why revisit the Bhopal disaster, since it is 
something that took place in 1984? The Bhopal Disaster underscores the 
culture and behavior of reckless transnational corporations. Both legally and 
morally there is a strong case that crimes were perpetrated on account of the 
preventable social harms caused, the neglect for occupational safety, the 
reckless approach to handling toxic chemicals, the failure of the company to 
act responsibly, putting workers to work with harmful substances for which 
they were neither trained to handle nor had knowledge about, etc. 
(Robertson and Fadil, 1998). At bottom, the company has culpability, 
particularly since just two years prior to the tragedy a safety audit by its U.S. 
experts indicated serious safety concerns at the Bhopal plant. Even if it were 
a case of sabotage, the circumstances leading up to the tragedy underscored 
gross disregard by the company that incubated a disaster. However, it must 
be said that the Indian authorities are not without blame (Pillay, 2006; 
Sharma, 2009; Sarangi, 2009). They were both a stakeholder and an oversight 
body and had wanted to see the Bhopal plant operated by locals. They were, 
and arguably still are, derelict in their duty to ensure the human rights of the 
people of Bhopal were reasonably protected.  
Even though the government passed the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Act to 
empower itself as the sole representative of the victims in court so as to 
expedite the legal process, it was nevertheless slothful in processing victims’ 
compensation. Today, the survivors see themselves as abandoned by the 
state and local government in their search for support to carry on their lives 
and treatment. The Indian government has responsibilities for having 
facilitated lax business conditions for the firm to operate (Sarangi, 2002; 
Sarangi, 2009; Morehouse and Subramaniam, 1986, 3; Bennett et al., 2005, 3). 
Moreover, the Indian government took control of the plant after the disaster, 
but the clean-up is still to be completed. The laboratory, for example, still 
contains chemicals, a further reason why residents of Bhopal feel abandoned 
by the state. For those who died, the disaster was the gravest assault on their 
right to life. For victim-survivors, the disaster violated in perpetuity their 
right to self determination in practically every way.  
If globalization is to be augmented as indeed it is through a proliferation of 
free trade agreements on the world stage and the liberalization markets, 
then matters of life and death cannot be ignored. Lawrence Summers 
(Economist, 1992) while serving as chief economist at the World Bank once 
wrote in an internal memo: 
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Shouldn’t the World Bank be encouraging more migration of the 
dirty industries to the less developed countries? The measurement of 
the costs of health-impairing pollution depends on the forgone 
earnings from increased morbidity and mortality. From this point of 
view, a given amount of health-impairing pollution should be done 
in the country with the lowest wages. I think the logic behind 
dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest-wage country is 
impeccable and we should face up to that. 
Summers’ line of reasoning no doubt reflects an apartheid psychology. It 
would appear that Union Carbide Corporation had already been a 
practitioner of this logic. Certainly it was not the only one. Summers’ leaked 
memo has cemented the fact that international financial institutions and 
transnational corporate entities do not necessarily act according to what is 
just but what is efficient within a narrow conspectus of progress. If 
globalization is to augment the cause of human happiness and flourishing 
on a global scale, then it has to be carried out within at least some minimum 
framework of social justice (Izarali, 2011). In this way, those who are not 
agents of the market or those who participate in the market through labour 
but lack the monetary wherewithal to protect against violations or seek 
recourse may be protected.  
The problem with globalization thus far is that it has been narrow in 
proliferating property rights when in fact it should be accompanied by the 
globalization of a more substantive set of basic rights (see Izarali, 2011; 
Monshipouri, Welch and Kennedy, 2003). When people’s basic rights are 
trampled on in the name of the market and economic efficiency, it ought to 
be considered some form of a crime (Friedrichs and Friedrichs, 2002; 
Ezeonu, 2009; Anderson, 2010). Thus, one ought to be able to talk about 
crimes and globalization.  
There are already international treaties in place as points of reference such as 
the twin covenants of human rights. There are merits to Professor Peter 
Singer’s (2004) claim that we need an extension of the criminal law at the 
global level. Moreover, as Friedrichs and Friedrichs (2002) and Ifeanyi 
Ezeonu (2009) have compellingly argued in making the case for crimes of 
globalization, we need to look beyond the rubric of seeing the idea of crime 
in criminology as a violation of some state law, so that we can talk about 
social harm. Globalization is still evolving and it is natural to think that the 
law has to likewise evolve on the global level. But criminologists likewise 
have to evolve to see globalization as something that is within the scope of 
criminology proper; in this way, crime and criminality relating to 




The Bhopal Disaster took place in the formative years of economic 
globalization in contemporary times. The attempt to try the case in New 
York represents the first time liability was raised by a Third World country 
against trans/multi-national corporation for violation of fundamental rights 
(Pillay, 2006, 485). The reception was/is sobering. The actions and 
consequences of the disaster were haunting then, but they reverberate up to 
the present time. It is fair to say that the culture of corporations is largely the 
same now as it was then, although in recent years there have been notable 
cases in the US where major companies have been investigated and CEO’s 
have been prosecuted. Moreover, there are some corporate entities that try to 
operate within certain parameters to avoid causing social harm and to be 
reasonably equitable to labour, and so one ought not to turn a blind eye to 
them. As globalization expands we can learn from the Bhopal tragedy, 
especially since justice still has not yet been delivered to Bhopal – for those 
deceased, those surviving, and the environment upon which all depend. 
When one looks at the case of gas flaring by transnational corporations in 
Nigeria and the health hazards they pose (Environmental Rights Action, 
2005), the toxic cyanide spill by the Omai goldmine company in the 
Essequibo River of Guyana, and the degradation of the Pak Mun Dam in 
Thailand, all in which no substantive positive net return value to the host 
societies appear to be evident, one cannot help but to ponder on the 
examples of the past such as the Bhopal Disaster. Reece Walters captures the 
salience of the Bhopal tragedy when he writes, “Bhopal provides lessons 
about, and challenges for, environmental justice; globalized trade and 
corporate power; corporate criminality and victim justice; regulation of 
transnational corporations, and the dangers associated with the trade-
oriented self-regulations within TNCs” (Walters, 2009, 325). There are good 
reasons for thinking that globalization can yield positive benefits to human 
society, but this cannot happen if a tunnel vision psychology steers 
international financial institutions, transnational corporate activities, ethics, 
and the administration of justice. Against all prevailing adversities, we must 
be hopeful for, and persevering toward, a mitigated globalization – one 
where justice and benefits are available to, and accessible by, the global 
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